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Abstract 
  Recent experimental evidence has led to a debate about the nature of utility functions in 
which people are concerned about the amount others earn, and what factors heighten or diminish 
social preference.  We explore fairness by examining behavior across three variants of the 
dictator game.  Using data from nearly 200 dictators allocating as much as $100 each, we observe 
that fairness considerations are very powerful—when subjects could reasonably believe that 
disproportionately low offers are “fair”, only 8-12 percent of dictators make positive offers.   
Examining the comparative static results from these allocation decisions, we find that recent 
theoretical models of inequality do a respectable job of explaining the data patterns. 
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 Important predictions from the game-theoretic literature are frequently rather 
extreme, leading expectations to be oftentimes unmet.  Perhaps the most well known 
example in the economics literature is a class of games that includes the popular 
ultimatum and dictator variants.
1  Although the dictator game arguably presents the 
simplest possible strategy space for subjects to understand, proposers do not ubiquitously 
send zero dollars to their partner (Camerer and Thaler, 1995).  Many authors have 
attempted to clarify this behavior by examining individual behavior within a theoretical 
framework.  This important line of research includes inequality models due to Bolton and 
Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999), as well as Andreoni et al.’s (1998) road 
map for building a more predictive model of fairness.
2 
Inextricably related to these studies is an influential line of research that suggests 
there is a critical link between social isolation and Nash play in bargaining games (e.g., 
Hoffman et al., 1994, hereafter HMSS).  The experimental design in this line of work 
permits an examination of the comparative static effect of varying social isolation while 
holding the level of “fairness” constant.  Reported results suggest that many individuals 
become Nash players as social isolation increases. 
Rather than examining the effect of changes in social isolation, in this note we 
hold social isolation constant and examine the comparative static effect of varying 
degrees of perceived fairness.  We accomplish this goal by analyzing decisions from 
                                                 
1The ultimatum game is a two-stage game where two people, a proposer and a responder, bargain over a 
fixed amount of money.  In the first stage, the proposer offers a split of the money, and in the second stage, 
the responder decides to accept or reject the offer.  If accepted, each player receives money according to the 
offer; if rejected, each player receives no money.  The dictator game is a simple variant of the ultimatum 
game.  In the dictator game, strategic concerns are absent as the proposer simply states what the split will 
be and the proposer has no veto power, rendering the proposed split as effective.   
2 The Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) models provide similar predictions except 
with respect to stakes. 
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nearly 200 subjects in dictator games that varied the level of stakes from $20 to $100 and 
varied the degree of “fairness” associated with disproportionately low offers.  Perceived 
fairness was varied by moving from the typical dictator baseline treatment to asymmetric 
and symmetric designs that served to allocate initial wealth based on individual 
proficiency on a 45-minute quiz.  In the asymmetric treatment, only the dictator was 
afforded the opportunity to earn wealth, whereas in the symmetric treatment both the 
dictator and responder had a chance to earn money.  
Our data provide three major insights.  First, the earnings component induced 
dictators to exhibit a considerably higher rate of self-interested behavior than previously 
reported (see, e.g., Forsythe et al., 1994; HMSS, 1994; Bohnet and Frey, 1999).  In the 
limit, we observe that only 8-12 percent of dictators make positive offers.  Second, 
increasing the stakes from $20 to $100 does not appreciably alter allocation decisions.  
Finally, certain aspects of our results are explained well by the comparative static 
predictions found in recent theoretical models of inequality.   
II. Experimental Design and Hypotheses 
Subjects that were unfamiliar with experimental games were recruited from the 
undergraduate student body at a large university in the U.S.  We conducted three 
sessions: a baseline treatment that was identical to the HMSS baseline and two earnings 
treatments: an asymmetric (77 pairs) and a symmetric (78 pairs) treatment.  In all respects 
we were careful to follow identical procedures in each session to ensure that the 
parameter social isolation remained constant, thus ensuring that any notion of strategic 
reciprocity would not change across treatments.  Participants were randomly assigned to 
two groups, with one placed in room A and the other placed in room B.  The two groups   3
did not have any contact before, during, or after the session.  Within each group, subjects 
were allowed to talk only to administrators.  Each treatment had at most two stages – 
earnings and allocation – and each had a written protocol to ensure consistency.  As is 
typical, no subject participated in more than one treatment, thus our results rely on purely 
between-subject variation. 
The Earnings Stage informed the designated group(s) that they would earn money 
by taking a quiz before moving to the second, and final, stage of the experiment.   
Subjects were informed that a simple rule would determine their earnings in the first 
stage of the experiment: if they answered 10 or more questions correctly they would 
receive $100; if they answered fewer than 10 questions correctly they would receive 
$20.
3  After addressing all questions, subjects were informed that they had 45 minutes to 
complete the quiz.  After the allotted time elapsed, the quiz was collected and graded.   
  The Allocation Stage randomly matched subjects across groups with the person in 
room A being the first-mover (proposer).  Instructions for the dictator game were read 
aloud to both groups and all questions were addressed.  The allocation (dictator) games 
were one-shot, and were done over the first-mover’s earnings.  To conclude, final 
earnings were determined and subjects departed individually with cash payment.   
An asymmetric earnings design provides our initial deviation from the baseline.  
In this treatment, only subjects assigned to room A participated in the earnings session.  
Subjects in room A were informed that “the person in Room B has not had the 
opportunity to earn any money.”  For time management, subjects assigned to room B 
arrived one hour after those assigned to room A.  The next deviation from the baseline is 
                                                 
3 The quiz is taken verbatim from List and Cherry (2000). 
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a symmetric earnings treatment.  In the symmetric earnings treatment, all subjects (rooms 
A and B) participated in the earnings session.  Subjects in both rooms were informed that 
“people in rooms A and B have earned an amount of money by participating in identical 
sessions.”  Subjects in both rooms were further informed that “the person in room B does 
not decide how to split his or her earnings—he or she keeps all of the earnings.”   
  Given the dichotomous outcome of the earnings session, we are provided with an 
opportunity to test the difference between low ($20) and high ($100) stakes within the 
two treatment types.  Our experimental design is summarized in Table 1, with treatments 
sub-categorized as baseline with low (high) stakes, B$20 (B$100), and asymmetric 
(symmetric) earnings with low stakes, A$20 (S$20), and asymmetric (symmetric) 
earnings with high stakes, A$100 (S$100).  Table 1 also provides sample sizes across the 
cells, which tend to be larger than previous studies and suggest that more than half of the 
subjects earned the right to distribute $100—43 out of 77 (41 out of 78) in the 
asymmetric (symmetric) treatment answered 10 or more of the 17 questions correctly. 
Making  F(•) the population distribution of offers, our series of main null 
hypotheses take the form Ho: F(Ti$Z) = F(Tj$Z), where i,j are treatment indicators for 
baseline, asymmetric, and symmetric, and i ≠ j; and Z represents stakes, therefore Z = 
$20, $100.  A secondary null hypothesis of interest concerns stakes: Ho: F(Ti$20) = 
F(Ti$100).  Rejecting the first null hypothesis in favor of the appropriate one-sided 
alternative suggests that relaxing the “fairness” constraint induces behavior more in line 
with the standard equilibrium prediction.  Concerning the secondary null hypotheses, if 
we reject the null, inference would be that stakes and allocation behavior are correlated.  
This would provide evidence of the predictive power of the Fehr and Schmidt (1999)   5
model, which predicts giving should increase with higher stakes (the model of Bolton and 
Ockenfels (2000) is agnostic on this issue). 
III.  Experimental Results 
  Table 2 summarizes the individual data obtained from our three dictator games. 
Figures 1-3 use these data to graphically depict the frequency distribution for each 
treatment.  Of first note is the finding that our baseline experimental data are qualitatively 
equivalent to results reported in other dictator games.  For example, our data are in large 
part consistent with the data reported in, for example, Hoffman et al. (1996), Eckel and 
Grossman (1996), and Bohnet and Frey (1999), as we find that rates of positive offers, 
equal splits, and average positive offers are in the range of 50 percent, 20 percent, and 30 
percent.   
Moving to our stakes hypotheses, we find that although the summary statistics in 
Table 2 and the figures suggest there are differences between the data across the $20 and 
$100 treatments, using a Wilcoxon nonparametric test we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the distributions are identical across stakes conditions in the baseline, 
asymmetric, or symmetric treatments at the conventional p < .05 level.
4  Although the 
increase in stakes appears to push the distributions rightward, suggesting dictators in high 
stakes games tend to offer more than dictators in low stakes games, this effect is not 
significant.
5  Directionally, this finding is in line with the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) 
                                                 
4 Given that this test may lack power (see, e.g., Forsythe et al., 1994), we also tested for distributional 
differences using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test.  In each case, we could not reject the null hypothesis of 
identical distributions at even the p = .50 level using the KS test.   
5 This finding is consistent with Forsythe et al.’s (1994) dictator game results and List and Cherry’s (2000) 
ultimatum game data.  We should note, however, a potentially important caveat:  since results from the quiz 
determined the stakes each individual allocated, there is a potential selection issue that could be an 
important influence on the reported results.  Future research should examine whether our results are robust 
to randomly allocating subjects to stake levels (while preserving the “earned” nature of the position). 
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model, which predicts less giving by $20 earners compared to those who earned $100.  
Yet, given that there is so little variation in the data, this prediction cannot be tested with 
a substantial amount of power.  Given that the stakes treatment did not significantly alter 
allocation decisions, we pool the $20 and $100 data for the statistical analysis below.   
Comparing data across the baseline and earnings treatments provides an 
interesting contrast.  Whereas our baseline treatments yield data in the spirit of the 
existing literature, dictators acting over earned wealth have distributions shifted toward 
lower offers in each case.  Figures 1-3 show the declination of offers as we move toward 
the treatments that fully relax the “fairness” constraint.  Wilcoxon nonparametric tests 
reinforce what the naked eye can readily see: although the asymmetric earnings and 
baseline distributions are not different from one another at conventional levels (z = 1.14), 
we can reject equivalency of the symmetric and baseline distributions at the p < .01 level 
(z = 3.24).  In addition, we find that the asymmetric and symmetric treatments yield 
different distributions at better than the p < .01 level (z = 2.70).   
Similar inference obtains when we consider the proportion of dominant strategy 
play (giving 0).  In contrast to the 50-55 percent of theoretically correct play observed in 
our baseline treatments, dictators acting over asymmetric earnings followed theory in 58-
71 percent of the allocation decisions.  The movement toward the standard equilibrium 
prediction continued when dictators acted over symmetric earnings—in 88-92 percent of 
cases dictators kept everything for themselves.  According to a test of proportions, these 
differences in theoretically correct play between the symmetric and baseline 
(asymmetric) treatment are each significantly different from zero at the p < .01 level   7
(symmetric vs. baseline: z = 4.55; symmetric vs. asymmetric: z = 3.85).
6  Furthermore, in 
the symmetric treatment, the proportion of zero offers was not significantly different 
from 100 percent at conventional significance levels (z = 1.82).   
While it would be easy to claim that earning entitlements (or property rights) 
matter, we feel that at best the effect is modest, and in fact not statistically significant.  
This interpretation follows from a comparison between the asymmetric and baseline 
treatments, which provide behavior that is not statistically distinguishable.  This finding 
is different from the data reported in Hoffman and Spitzer (1985) and HMSS (1994), who 
find results that suggest earning, rather than being randomly assigned, the first-mover 
position mitigates the influence of social norms that may lead to other-regarding 
behavior.  Our results suggest that an important disparity may exist between the 
underlying notion of earning the property right of a social position and earning wealth. 
Our experimental design is sufficiently rich to allow one final test of existing 
theories of social utility.  In our view, a descriptive model of social utility should yield 
predictions about when fairness or inequality should matter a great deal, leading to large 
deviations from self-interest, and when behavior should be consistent with self-interest.  
In this regard, certain extant theories describe an important aspect of our data.  When 
comparing results across the asymmetric and symmetric designs, we find that the Bolton 
and Ockenfels’ (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) models have a good deal of 
                                                 
6 Table 2 also reports that the frequency of equal splits decreased dramatically when the “fairness” aspect 
was relaxed.  While the baseline treatment observed equal splits in 25 and 15 percent of allocation 
decisions, equal splits occurred in only 9 percent (7 of 77) of the asymmetric allocation decisions and only 
5 percent (4 of 78) of the symmetric earnings allocation decisions.    8
predictive power—giving is significantly lower in the symmetric treatment, as predicted 
by their inequality aversion theories.
7   
IV.  Conclusion 
The importance of experimental results from allocation games is more than 
academic curiosity, as some scholars believe certain results may represent a fatal flaw in 
standard economic theory—the commonly coined “fall of homo-economicus.”  In this 
study, we presented experimental results from an allocation game in which subjects 
earned initial wealth.  Examining experimental data from nearly 200 subjects in dictator 
games that varied the level of stakes from $20 to $100 and varied the degree of “fairness” 
associated with disproportionately low offers, we found that fairness considerations are 
quite strong: only 8-12 percent of dictators made positive offers when the fairness 
constraint was sufficiently relaxed.  Our data also suggest that neither an increase in 
stakes (from $20 to $100) nor the entitlement property considerably influenced allocation 
decisions.  Finally, certain patterns in our data are consonant with comparative static 
predictions of recent inequality models.
8   
                                                 
7 These models also predict that giving should be greater in S$100 versus S$20.  While the data are not 
consonant with this prediction, it should be stressed that since dictators did not know the probability 
weights over their partner’s allocation this test is not clean.   
8 While our data suggest that fairness matters, the literature has pointed to several other aspects that 
influence behavior as well (see, e.g., Nelson’s (2002) ultimatum game study).   9
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Table 1  Experimental Design 
Treatment (n)  Game  Earnings  Stakes 
B$20 (20)  Dictator  None  $20 
B$100 (20)  Dictator  None  $100 
A$20 (34)  Dictator  Asymmetric  $20 
A$100 (43)  Dictator  Asymmetric  $100 
S$20 (37)  Dictator  Symmetric  $20 



















B$20  (20)  0.5000 0.2500 0.3300 
B$100  (20)  0.4500 0.1500 0.2831 
A$20  (34)  0.2941 0.1176 0.3600 
A$100  (43)  0.4186 0.0697 0.2083 
S$20  (37)  0.0811 0.0541 0.4333 
S$100  (41)  0.1220 0.0488 0.3100 
*reported as percentage of total amount available in the allocation decision (average 
positive offer ignores zero-offers). 
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